01x04 - Part Four

[bunniefuu]

-For the second

time in nasa's history,

A space shuttle has been

lost along with its entire crew.

Once again, we

are asking ourselves,

How could this have happened?

-Do you have any

idea how big that

Piece of foam was that came off?

-We'd heard some

reports that during launch

There had been some

concerns that some debris

Hit the wing.

Is that true and is that

any cause of concern

And that could have

caused today's problems?

-It is true.

It was judged that, erm ,

That event did not

represent a safety concern.

-This happened under my watch,

But I didn't have the answers.

In every public forum

I'm gonna have to be in,

How am I gonna

explain this to anybody?

At this time, we

have no indication

That the mishap was

caused by anything

Or anyone on the ground.

-Nasa never

wants to look stupid.

Nasa wants to be the

agency with the answers.

-My thoughts are

on what we missed,

What I missed

To allow this to happen.

-But if you overlook something,

It will come to bite

you one day or another.

♪

♪

-I was playing tennis

in mclean, virginia.

I received a phone call saying

That I would be

flown immediately

To barksdale air force base.

After challenger,

Nasa had a

contingency plan in case

There was a shuttle accident.

I never really imagined

that it would happen.

With columbia, we had

people who had experience

With accident investigation

from the military,

Navy, and air force on the team.

-I came to the investigation

as a helicopter pilot

Who knew something about

doing accident investigations.

I did not come to

the investigation

As a space shuttle expert.

I literally knew nothing about

How the shuttle

was put together.

We needed nasa's help

because by definition,

Everybody who came

in as an external part

Of the investigation team

is not a space shuttle expert.

There was years of

shuttle program knowledge

That we needed to

learn very quickly.

-There's that issue

of the falling foam

During the launch of

space shuttle columbia.

-Very early on nasa told us

That they knew about

a foam a debris event.

But we didn't even know

enough about the shuttle

To understand that there

was foam on the tanks.

The press wants to

know what happened

And it's like,

"yep, so do we."

-It's a mammoth job for those

taking part in a mammoth task.

-Covering many

hundreds of square miles.

-It's the largest

recovery effort

That has ever been

attempted in this country.

-As an investigator,

I wanted as ironclad a case

As we could possibly

have for the sequence

Of events leading to

the cause of the crash

Of space shuttle columbia.

But if we were going to do that,

We needed to

collect all the debris

And reconstruct the shuttle.

-1,200 sites have

been identified.

-All those pieces of

columbia will be brought

To the kennedy space center,

Where it will be reassembled

In a manner of speaking.

-Really thousands

of pieces of debris

Are now pieces to a puzzle.

♪

-Under a crisp texas sky,

Thousands of

mourners are gathering,

Including that man,

neil armstrong ,

As nasa gathers to say

farewell to seven of its own.

-Knowing that I wasn't

gonna see my dad again

And losing that many people

That you love and that

you're close to all at once.

It was just so heavy.

The world just

became a scary place.

-Just felt like I

was so, like

Raw, just so Exposed.

-To have your dad

die in a public way,

And you have press

focused in on you.

I knew I didn't

want to be there.

-Just like a feeling of, like,

How are we supposed to act?

-The grief is heavy.

Our nation shares

in your sorrow.

And in your pride.

-This isn't my

own personal loss.

You kind of realise that

this this is a public story,

A national grieving.

Everybody felt like they

lost something of theirs.

-In your grief, you

are responding

As your friends

would have wished,

With focus, professionalism,

and unbroken faith

In the mission of this agency.

The people of nasa are

being tested once again.

-I could see outside

the window all the crowd.

I had my suit and tie on.

And I said to myself,

"I'm gonna go outside,"

And then I couldn't.

I just shut the door,

Locked it, and I just

sobbed at my desk.

The president's talking

outside, and I was just sobbing,

And sobbing, and sobbing.

Inside johnson space center,

The internal

conflict was building.

-On the first day

that we went in,

There were people who

received us very well,

There were people who were

not happy that we were here.

-I was one of the first people

To be interviewed

and interrogated.

I felt ok, I felt like,

"this is a good thing,

This has to happen. I

hope they're thorough."

-I think the folks

that were probably

Less interested in our help

Were more at the

management level in nasa.

In some cases,

we're asking for data,

And then they'd be

like, "I can't give you

That information right

now, you're gonna have to

Go up through a very formal

Nasa chain of command

to be approved."

-I call it the managers' club.

It's a type of a culture

Where there are rules of

behaviour and ways of talking.

You don't jump the

chain of command.

Don't and that's

insulting to go up to

Someone higher and ask directly.

You're supposed to

coordinate all your questions.

-Are you going to risk

your career in nasa

By standing up and arguing

with the chain of command?

-You don't talk bluntly

or pose questions like that

To a nasa manager.

-Because that can

be very career limiting

And you find yourself shuffled

off into a windowless room,

Just going through paperwork.

-I want the system I want the

nasa manager culture confronted.

♪

-Good afternoon,

everybody, and welcome

To the johnson space center

For today's briefing.

Again, joining me is

Shuttle program

manager ron dittemore.

-Today I brought with

me a piece of foam,

And I think we've made

some foam available to you

So that you can

get an understanding

Of the composition

of this material.

It's very lightweight,

which is logical.

You would want

it to be lightweight

Because the more

weight you put on the tank,

The less upmass you

could launch into an orbit.

So, it's difficult for us

to believe as engineers,

As management and as a team,

That this particular piece

of foam debris shedding

From the tank represented

a safety of flight issue.

-I caught some

segment that ron got into

In which he said in

a declarative voice

-Right now, it just does

not make sense to us

That a piece of debris

Would be the root cause

For the loss of

columbia and its crew.

There's got to be

another reason.

-Well, how can he say that?

Where is he getting that from?

What a big denial.

-To be certain it was

foam is nonsense, right?

But to be certain it wasn't

foam is equally nonsense.

Right? And that's

what they were saying.

"it's not foam." well,

how do you know?

-I know from

The accident investigation

team's perspective,

No one was gonna go public

And say, "we know

what didn't happen."

-You get that shot right there?

That's a nasa official.

He's holding a piece of foam,

Which he is now saying

Could not have had enough impact

'cause it's too light to

have damaged those tiles

That we've been talking about.

-I knew ron. I had

respect for ron.

Ron was linda ham's boss

And a good manager.

But what's always

the first step in grief?

Denial.

-I called ron and I said,

"ron, let me just

remind you, ok?

We had a clear understanding

That we are not gonna

eliminate anything

Until the data has come in

To definitively eliminate it."

-To bring that out

And dismiss it, you

know, pre-emptively,

I think speaks volumes.

At the very least they

had to acknowledge it.

But it was acknowledging

their own mistakes

And that's hard to do.

♪

-Each week there

was a new trailer load

Of debris showed up,

Came right in this hangar

through those doors,

And it would be catalogued

and then put out on the floor.

I want to know what

the debris is telling us,

I want to know what the

aerodynamics are telling us,

And I want to know what

the sensors are telling us.

You follow the debris,

what's it telling you?

♪

And if you follow the logic,

You begin to see pieces

that are telling you a story.

As we were progressing through

the left-wing reconstruction,

You can see these burned tiles,

This reinforced carbon-carbon,

Looks like it's been burned

In a way that's very

different than everything else.

All of that data pointed to

a problem at rcc panel 8.

Something very different

Happened in this

location on the orbiter.

And so, let's go see if we

can understand what that was.

-Ok, so, as the vehicle is

entering the atmosphere,

These black tiles are

protecting the structure,

The aluminium of the

vehicle, in high-heat areas.

And the grey is the

wing leading edge

Reinforced

carbon-carbon, rcc panels.

Those protect the vehicle

from the highest level of heat,

Those 3,000 degree temperatures,

So that you don't

get metal melting.

But we had never had any

experience in breaking a panel.

-What was starting to join up

was you've got video analysis

That says the

strike on the orbiter

Created a hole in the wing.

And you can see

that there had been

Some sort of penetration

Against the rcc panel.

Hot gas had entered in,

The shuttle had lost

aerodynamic control and crashed.

But I think the challenge

for a lot of folks at nasa

Was believing that

foam had done that.

They would say foam can't

break reinforced carbon-carbon.

There were a lot of people

that said there's something else

That explains this.

-We decided to ask nasa

about the history of foam strikes,

Which had never been done.

-I was asked by the

accident investigation team

To help find that

type of information.

I went through a database,

There's a historical database

of all the space shuttle missions,

From the very first shuttle

mission up until that day.

I called the investigators

And I said, "you're

not gonna believe this.

Take a look at this."

♪

-I was shocked to find

That there were over a

half a dozen occurrences

Of foam strikes recorded.

So, we turned that in into

the investigation board.

-1983 was the first

bipod ramp foam loss.

1990, 1992,

'92 again, 1994.

As well as those bigger pieces,

We saw small pieces of foam

Fall away all the time.

What we call "popcorning".

When popcorn pops, it

pops up and comes out

And so that's what

we call it, popcorning.

They weren't very big

so you're not talking about

Much damage to the tiles.

And so, it had become

the norm at nasa.

This mantra "it's only foam,

It's only foam.

Hey, we see foam

loss all the time.

And it never did any

damage to the vehicle.

We don't have to worry about it,

It's only foam."

Two missions before columbia

it happened on sts-112 atlantis.

A significant

strike hit the skirt

Of the solid rocket booster

and actually put a dent in it.

-Prior till the

launch of columbia,

And a couple of the meetings,

The topic of foam

coming off 112 came up.

There's probably, erm

15 to 20 people around the table

And then there's a lot of other

people at nasa in the room.

We talked about starting to

look into this a little bit more

Because we've seen it

come off on, you know,

More than one flight now.

We should understand if

there's a way to prevent it.

-Late October of 2002,

after sts-112 atlantis,

I went to a meeting

about that flight.

I had put together a

report about the foam loss

And the damage to

the solid rocket booster.

And I presented

the case that said,

"that amount of foam,

That mass,

In one chunk coming

off shuttle atlantis

This was the vehicle telling

us something is wrong,

Here's your warning."

At risk of being insubordinate,

I said to the heads

of the shuttle program

Sitting around the centre table,

I was adamant at that meeting,

"either fix the problem

Or don't fly an external

tank on the next launch,

Which is impossible."

From that meeting,

I never heard any discussion of

"let's get a better

understanding of this

Before we schedule

the next launch."

-In other words, again,

they were thinking

It was more of a

turnaround issue.

And so, it wasn't

preventing shuttle flights

From going forward.

-The pressure on the management

team to stay on schedule

And the concept

of, "it's just foam"

Is leading the charge

through all of this.

-So, it wasn't like they weren't

talking about issues at all,

But there certainly was a big

focus on the on the schedule.

-Here's an e-mail, it's

Tuesday January 21st,

This was sent six days

into the columbia mission.

This is a private

exchange between

Linda ham and ron dittemore,

Two of the top

managers in the program.

"the rationale for flight

for the sts-112 loss of foam

Was lousy.

The rationale states, 'we

haven't changed anything,

We haven't

experienced any safety

Of flight damage

in 112 flights.'"

The concluding sentence

"the rationale was

lousy then and it still is"

What I take that to mean is that

Linda ham is raising a concern,

But they appear to rely on

the fact that previous flights

Which had suffered

this foam loss,

Had returned safely.

In other words, "we've

gotten away with this".

This is a failure to learn

from past similar events,

Simply because those flights

Did not have catastrophic

consequences.

The classic the classic

normalisation of deviance.

-You have to make sure

That every incident is

thoroughly investigated

And properly assessed.

And that wasn't done

for the 112 foam loss.

-People were saying they

were willing to accept the risk.

What they didn't understand is

How much risk

they were accepting.

After the 112 loss,

people were starting to say,

"maybe we're

accepting too much risk."

-We should have

never launched columbia

Until we fixed that problem.

-Yeah, I was

concerned, you know?

We were moving

in the right direction,

We just didn't

get there in time.

♪

-Good afternoon,

everybody, and welcome to

The johnson space

center for today's briefing.

♪

-Lisa starke with abc news.

When you realized

that you had this debris

That had struck the shuttle

and you started your analysis,

What was the discussion

about trying to take a look

Either through satellites

or these large telescopes

That the military has and

why was the decision made

Not to try that?

-We certainly had

that discussion.

We believe that

taking a picture ,

Looking for tile damage,

It does not show

us the depth of tile

That may have been shaved off.

We cannot make a

determination conclusively

Whether that represents

a concern or not.

- Well, linda, reading

through the transcripts,

In hindsight were you

sufficiently open to the idea

That this was a really

serious problem?

-You're asking 20/20

hindsight or what

What my thought was then?

-Well, it sounds like

you were just kind of

Seeking reassurance

that everything was ok,

As opposed to

digging in and saying,

'how do we know this? '

-I didn't have a preconceived

notion on the damage

Or the possible consequences,

and I needed to wait for them

To complete their work.

-The best experts at

our disposal concluded

That it was a minor problem,

not a significant problem.

-And when you added all that up,

There was no

need to take pictures

To document any evidence

Because we believed

it to be superficial

And it to be a turnaround issue

And not a safety issue.

And so we we

didn't take any pictures.

-Had we known that there was

A catastrophic

situation on orbit,

We certainly would have

done everything we could.

-Absolutely.

-I

I'm not aware of anybody

else during the mission

Asking for a photo

request and when.

I only learned later

That there really were

People outside of our team

That were trying to

do something about it.

-I had no idea

what was happening

Because there was

no communication.

I'm not in the loop,

I'm not in the know,

Nobody's talking to each other,

So nobody knows what's going on.

-The problem that we

had in nasa culturally

At the time was people would

not speak up with their concerns.

It was the most anti-dissenting

opinion place that I know of.

People were scared

silly to speak up.

-Nasa is a series of fiefdoms,

And there isn't necessarily a

lot of exchange of knowledge

Across those silos,

you know, frankly,

The system is not designed

for good communication.

But that's not an excuse,

Because this foam problem

was a not a new problem.

It was ignored right

up until an opportunity

To intervene presented itself,

And then that opportunity

to get a spy satellite

To take a look was dismissed.

To sort of stick to your

g*ns of convincing yourself

That it's ok

It just made matters worse.

-I-I could I could

only deal with the data

That was presented to me.

The whole situation was a

case of people doing their jobs

As they understood them.

But I think everybody was

operating with good faith.

There was no, er

I wouldn't say

malfeasance, but negligence.

There may have been

I don't even think

there was negligence,

I just think that

the actions we took

Were inadequate for the

problem we were facing.

-I think there was a

mindset and sort of a hope

That we've seen

foam strikes before

And it's never caused

a safety of flight issue.

So, we're assuming

that's the case here,

But not a sure thing.

It seemed like by

staying ignorant

Of the degree of damage,

The mission management team

Perhaps didn't want to know

about the worst-case scenario.

-At this point, from

our work in the hangar,

I think we have

enough information

To say we found the physical

cause of the shuttle crash.

But there were

still people at nasa

Who didn't believe that foam

Could break reinforced

carbon-carbon.

-We're here at southwest

research institute

In san antonio,

texas, to conduct a test

To show whether foam

could create a hole big enough

To destroy the vehicle.

-Everything came

down to whether or not

The foam shot was

gonna break an rcc panel.

But if our investigative

analysis is wrong, then what?

-Five, four, three, two, one.

-Whoa!

[ indistinct chatter ]

♪

-Ok. Foam will break

reinforced carbon-carbon.

-I mean, there was no

doubt at that point, right?

Case closed.

There's no denying it.

You know, there was there

was foam falling from day one.

They should have had

that test on day two.

-This was a known failure.

But I think the failure

to imagine being wrong,

The failure to imagine

the consequences of failure

Were catastrophic.

And I think it's this

whole notion of the failure

To imagine failure.

-Nasa's trying to move forward

After Tuesday's

blistering report,

Blaming it for

failing to prevent

The shuttle columbia tragedy.

-Nasa stands accused

of complacency

Of a flawed safety culture

Of major management failures.

Technical failures, but

also about a human failure.

-Nasa had conflicting

goals of cost,

Schedule, and safety.

It's our view that clearly

there is still evidence

Of a silent safety program

with echoes of challenger.

-They knew about the foam,

They could take pictures,

and people chose not to.

Felt almost like they

had betrayed him.

-Why?

Why?

The only reason

Was because of the way

They made decisions

within that culture.

-I felt angry. I mean, I just

Was extremely disappointed.

-Pure grief and sadness

turned into anger and disgust.

It kind of became this

inner struggle in me of,

"how can I hate this thing

that my dad loved so much?"

♪

-Well, it goes without

saying that we were all trying

To do the right thing all along.

We were basing our decisions

On the best information

that we had at the time.

Nobody wanted to do

any harm to anyone.

-If a bunch of things

went really right

And they identified

very early on

And got images early on

And everything

went about perfectly,

Just maybe

There could have

been a rescue mission.

But it's questionable whether

you could get the other orbiter,

Which would have

been atlantis in this case,

Processed and out

to the pad in time

Without putting that

crew at serious risk.

We would have had to

pull together this huge effort

In the eleventh hour

to figure out how to fly

One shuttle next to the other

To conduct an operation

That you'd never

trained or prepared for.

It was not in the

art of the possible

Given what we knew.

-The one tool we could

have tried to look at

Was changing the

way entry is done,

Trying to change how it

enters the atmosphere.

You can change the

angle of attack coming in

So you can lessen

the heat in certain areas

By moving to the other side

and then come back again.

-We can do all the "woulda,

shoulda" all day long here.

That's easy.

When you actually have to

make the decisions real time,

You're doing some

really complicated stuff.

That's a lot harder.

-I think that rick would

have wanted to have known

Something was very

wrong with the vehicle,

So he could have the

opportunity to repair something

Or fix something.

But at the same time,

there was also a trust

That nasa would look

out for their best interest.

-In terms of a hypothetical

And I think other

people in senior levels

That probably felt

the same way

If we knew that the crew

wasn't gonna survive,

Why would we tell them?

Why wouldn't we let them

just carry out their mission

And feel like they were

successful you know?

-The thing I can't get

past is, if we had of known

That entry was going to

cause loss of the vehicle

And loss of the crew,

there are things we can do

As human beings.

And that is for the families,

The chance to be

able to say goodbye.

That wasn't afforded to anyone.

And that's always haunted me.

Sorry.

♪

-Yes, there were individuals

who made very poor decisions.

You need to embrace

dissenting opinions,

And if somebody says,

"hey, let's get better data

To make a decision,"

Why is getting better

data a-a problem?

But, I mean, I was

in mission control.

I was a nasa employee. I

knew about the foam strike.

When there's

blame that's laid out,

I am right up there

saying I knew.

And I and I wish I could've

done something differently.

But I-I can't undo that.

And it you can just make

it better for those that follow.

-I feel ashamed.

So, who's guilty?

I'm not just gonna say

The program managers are.

We're all guilty.

If you don't speak up

for your own system

And you're the victims

of this environment,

We're guilty, too.

-During the mission, I could

have easily done a story

Saying, "this thing happened.

While nasa is

saying it's nothing,

Some engineers believe

there may be some concern."

What if I had done that?

I was the one who could have

Should have and could have

Owned that story in a way

That potentially even

might have changed

The course of events.

I definitely failed at my job.

Just like they failed at theirs.

And so, I'm part of the problem.

[ applause ]

- ladies and gentlemen,

The president of

the united states.

- In 2010, the space shuttle,

After nearly 30 years of duty,

Will be retired from service.

-The minute columbia

evaporated over texas,

The shuttle program

was ready to be retired.

That's when I felt like,

"wow, was all this in vain?

No more shuttle

program. They died.

What did he what

did they accomplish?"

There was not a lot

positive at that point in time.

-The legacy of

columbia must carry on.

The shuttle's chief purpose

over the next several years

Will be to help finish assembly

Of the international

space station.

-This could easily

have just stopped cold,

But we made a decision to

continue this exploration quest

That they just

gave their lives for.

-2, 1. Booster ignition

And lift off of the

space shuttle discovery

Returning to the space station

Paving the way for

future missions beyond.

-I was very quickly

assigned to the second return

To flight mission sts-121.

-Steve lindsey joined

on the flight deck

By pilot mark kelly,

headed for six months

On the international

space station.

-You know, certainly one

of the legacies of columbia

And the entire

space shuttle program

Is we learned how

to more safely fly

The shuttle to

honour its commitment

As part of the

international space station.

-For that mission

we did space walks

To practise

repairing tile outside,

To repair the leading

edge of the wing,

The reinforced carbon-carbon.

We developed techniques

To make sure that

we had the ability

To repair the space shuttle

If we find another hole

in the wing or the tile.

♪

-Atlantis, welcome to the

international space station

For the last time.

-The shuttle had at long

last served its purpose,

In building the space station.

But, as time went

on, it was evident

It was time to move

onto something else.

And frankly something

with a fundamental redesign.

-Having fired the

imagination of a generation,

Its place in history secured,

The space shuttle pulls

into port for the last time

It's voyage at an end.

-The idea of the us not

having its own capability

To fly to space

again was looming.

And I think if you

took that away,

We would feel as if we'd

lost something meaningful

And really central to

our national identity.

The question for nasa was

What happens next?

♪

-And here we go.

5. Core stage engine start

3, 2, 1

Boosters and ignition.

And lift off of artemis 1.

We rise together back

to the moon and beyond.

♪

-By going back to the moon

and eventually onto mars,

We can honour our fallen

crew members from columbia

And their families.

-Artemis is a new rocket

and a new space craft

To send humans to the moon.

As the mission management

team chair for artemis 1,

I took lessons learned

From the columbia

accident investigation report

And used that to

guide the structure

Of the mission management team

To ensure we could

hear dissenting opinions

And other information

was being communicated

In spite of potential management

or communication challenges.

It's tragic we had to go through

The columbia

accident to get here.

So, I always remind

myself of what's at stake

If we don't retain

those lessons.

-As always, nasa's

arrow is pointed up

Towards the stars

as it should be.

It's about the united states ,

And our partners,

remaining the leaders

In aerospace technology

and exploration.

Here in the united

states senate,

I've got a little say on

some of these programs,

And I'm trying to make sure

that nasa has the resources

It needs to fly people in

space as safely as possible.

American astronauts

flying on american rockets

From american soil

into space once again.

It's a very exciting time

for our space program.

Sending people into

space is dangerous.

More dangerous than most things.

It's one of the riskiest things

that people have ever done.

-To be able to experience

this incredible career

Of being an astronaut

was something

That we always

called a calculated risk.

Rick died doing something that

he was very passionate about.

In the end, I had to very

purposely make a decision

That this was not

gonna be something

That was gonna define

me for the rest of my life.

I didn't want to go down

that path of "it's your fault

Or your fault, or

I'm angry about this

And I can't let go of it."

None of that was a path

I wanted to go on at all.

I want to be a great mom

And I want to be productive

And not just be

stuck in that one spot.

And god has been very

merciful to help me with that

Just to be able to

keep moving forward.

-I was angry that my mom

chose to take that risk

Instead of staying with me.

And I know it's

probably a great benefit

To the scientific community

And maybe a

small risk of failure,

But it's still kind of painful.

-Daddy, I'm here!

-Hi!

-Oh, my gosh.

It's crazy over here, right?

-[ giggles ]

-You need your sunglasses?

Try 'em on.

This is laurel, and

she's my daughter.

She has a lot of

my mom's spirit.

The same enthusiasm

and positivity.

♪

I imagine

It would be harder if she

wasn't such a great kid.

So, I got pretty lucky there.

♪

-Nasa has released video footage

Taken inside the c*ck

Of the space shuttle columbia.

It was recorded in

the final moments

Before the shuttle broke up.

The last part of the tape

was burnt up in the accident.

-It's years since the accident,

And I've kind of

reframed the way

That I look at nasa as a whole.

I forgive them.

And that my family

forgives them.

I think I still feel a

little bit ambivalent

About the future of

space exploration.

Part of me kind of wants

to keep my distance.

But I realise my dad

died doing what he loved.

And there's still kind

of that little bit in me

That if I got the

chance to go to space,

I think I can't pass

up the opportunity

To see what he saw.

It would just be so moving

To kind of put

myself in his shoes.